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Fuller: Article 7.12 of the Texas Business Corporation Act is the Exclusi

CORPORATIONS-Stockholder Liability-Article 7.12 of the
Texas Business Corporation Act is the Exclusive Expression
of the Trust Fund Theory in Texas.
Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp.
620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981).
In May of 1975, Theodore Olin Moeller was struck and permanently
disabled by a falling elevator. The elevator had been installed in 1960 by
the Hunter-Hayes Elevator Company. Hunter-Hayes serviced the elevator until 1964, when it sold its assets to the Dover Corporation for 25,000
shares of Dover stock. Hunter-Hayes subsequently changed its name to
the H. H. Hunter Corporation, distributed the Dover stock to its shareholders, and was issued a certificate of dissolution in March of 1964.
Since the corporation had been dissolved eleven years earlier, Moeller relied upon the "trust fund theory" in a suit against the former shareholders of Hunter-Hayes.1 The trial court granted a summary judgment for
the defendant shareholders because the suit had not been brought within
three years of dissolution of the corporation, as required by article 7.12 of
the Texas Business Corporation Act.2 The Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Texas law allows recovery
from the former shareholders of a corporation under the trust fund theory.3 Moeller appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. Held-Reversed. ArAct is the exclusive expresticle 7.12 of the Texas Business Corporation
4
sion of the trust fund theory in Texas.
At common law, all pending claims against a corporation were abated
upon dissolution of the corporation.' To relieve the inequities created by
1. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex. 1981). The other
defendants unsuccessfully cross-claimed against the former shareholders of Hunter-Hayes
and were denied this relief. Id. at 553.
2. See id. at 548-49.
3. Fort Worth Capital Corp. v. Hunter, 608 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1980), rev'd., 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981).
4. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981).
5. See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S.
120, 125 (1937); Life Ass'n. of America v. Goode, 71 Tex. 90, 95-96, 8 S.W. 639, 640 (1888);
15A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 8127, 8142 (rev.
perm. ed. 1979); Schoone, Shareholder Liability Upon Voluntary Dissolution of Corporation, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 415, 416 (1961); 48 IOWA L. REV. 1006, 1006-09 (1963). The most

common explanation given by earlier courts for this doctrine is the analogy of the corporation to a dead man.
It follows, therefore, that as the death of the natural person abates all pending litiga-
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this rule, the judiciary created the artifice of the trust fund theory to preserve the claims of legitimate creditors which were not brought until after
the debtor corporation's dissolution.4 Under this theory, courts of equity
imposed an equitable lien on the distributed assets of the dissolved corporation to enable creditors, who had claims which had come into being
before the corporation had been dissolved, to pursue their claims after
the corporation had been dissolved.' The trust fund theory was, therefore,
created for, and limited to, the assertion of claims originating prior to
dissolution.'
Texas courts have consistently recognized the existence of the trust
fund theory, although they have never allowed its use as a means of circumventing the restrictions imposed by equivalent statutory provisions.
tion to which such person is a party, dissolution of a corporation at common law
abates all pending litigation in which the corporation is appearing either as plaintiff
or defendant. To allow actions to continue would be to continue the existence of the
corporation pro hac vice. But corporations exist for specific purposes, and only by
legislative act, so that if the life of the corporation is to continue, even only for litigating purposes, it is necessary that there should be some statutory authority for the
prolongation.
Oklahoma Nat. Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1926).
6. See Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,994).
7. See, e.g., Hollins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 382-84 (1893); Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Ham, 114 U.S. 587, 594 (1885); Gaskins v. Bonfils, 79 F.2d 352,
355 (10th Cir. 1935). At least one author argues that despite the name "trust fund theory,"
this doctrine is in fact a type of equitable lien. Norton, Relationship of Shareholders of
Corporate Creditors Upon Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of CorporateAssets, 30 Bus. LAW. 1061, 1067-72 (1975). But cf. Hollins v. Brierfield
Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 383 (1893) (actual effect of doctrine explained as "a trust in
the administration of assets after possession. . . rather than a trust attaching to the property, as such, for the direct benefit of either creditor or stockholder"); Graham v. Railroad
Co., 102 U.S. 148, 161 (1880) (Court implies the doctrine actually creates a trust fund).
8. See, e.g., Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1893) (discussion of the true nature of the trust fund theory); Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. 304, 307-08
(1853) (trust fund created for unpaid creditors after dissolution of debtor corporation);
Stewart v. United States, 327 F.2d 201, 202 (10th Cir. 1964) (United States allowed to recover from dissolved corporation for overcharges on transporting government property).
Claims originating prior to dissolution are those which can trace some basis to the predissolution era of the corporation. Otherwise, if a claim can find no existence in the predissolution era of the corporation, it is a post-dissolution claim which can not be asserted
under the trust fund theory. Compare Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 96
(N.D. Iowa 1968) (post-dissolution claim) with Snyder v. State-Wide Properties Inc., 235 F.
Supp. 733, 742 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (pre-dissolution claim).
9. See, e.g., Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 147 Tex. 608, 616, 218 S.W.2d 451, 455
(1949) (trustees of dissolved corporation allowed, within three years of dissolution, to enforce option contract acquired by corporation before dissolution); McBride v. Clayton, 140
Tex. 71, 76-78, 166 S.W.2d 125, 128 (1942) (action by stockholder of dissolved corporation to
acquire proceeds of life insurance policy of president of corporation); Burkburnett Ref. Co.
v. Ilseng, 292 S.W. 179, 180 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted) (directors of dis-
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The first set of statutes embodying the trust fund theory in Texas were
enacted in 1871.10 Those statutes permitted creditors to sue the stockholders of the dissolved debtor corporation for its unpaid debts to the
extent of assets received upon dissolution. 1 The statutes were amended
in 1907 to provide a three year time limit in which causes of action arising
prior to dissolution could be brought after dissolution.1 2 In Lyon-Gray
Lumber Co. v. Gibralter Life Insurance Co.,"s the Texas Commission of
Appeals explained the effect of these statutes as constituting a continuation of the corporate entity strictly for the purpose of satisfying its outstanding debts. " In 1955 these early statutes and their successors were
superseded by article 7.12 of the Texas Business Corporation Act, which
is patterned after section 105 of the Model Business Corporation Act.'

solved corporation suing to collect debt acquired before dissolution). There are cases in
which Texas courts have allowed recovery on the basis of the trust fund theory, without
discussing the equivalent statutory embodiment of the theory, but these cases seem to allow
the trust fund theory to be used only as it could be used under the relevant statute. See
Waggoner v. Herring-Showers Lumber Co., 120 Tex. 605, 614, 615, 40 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1931)
(dissolved corporation's assets held trust fund for payment of creditors, suit would also meet
statutory requirements); Orr & Lindley Shoe Co. v. Thompson, 89 Tex. 501, 502-03, 35 S.W.
473 (1896) (creditor of dissolved corporation cannot exclude other creditors from participation in assets set up as trust fund).
10. 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 80, §§ 39-43, at 75, 76, 7 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 76
(1898).
11. See id. §§ 39-43, at 75, 76, 7H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 76 (1898). The statutes
provided:
Upon the dissolution of any corporation already created by or under the laws of this
state, . . . the president and directors or managers of the affairs of the corporation at
the time of its dissolution, . . . shall be trustees of the creditors and stockholders of
such corporation . . . and for this purpose they may maintain or defend any judicial
proceeding.
Id. § 39, at 75, 7 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 76 (1898).
If any corporation created under ... statute of this state .
be dissolved, leaving
debts unpaid, suits may be brought against any person or persons who were stockholders at the time of such dissolution, . . . for the recovery of the portion of such
debt for which they were liable...
Id. § 41, at 75, 7 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 76 (1898). These statutes embody the trust
fund theory in three respects: 1) they allow claims arising before dissolution to be asserted
afterward, 2) they allow creditors to follow the distributed assets to the stockholders, and 3)
they limit the liabili.ty of the corporate officers and shareholders to the amount of distributed assets received upon dissolution. Compare Drew v. United States, 367 F.2d 828, 830
(Ct. Cl. 1966) (discussion of trust fund) with 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 80, §§ 39-43, at 74, 7
H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 76 (1898) (statutory embodiment of trust fund theory).
12. 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. CLXVI, § 7, at 312; see Burkburnett Ref. Co. v. Ilseng,
292 S.W. 179, 181 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted); Lyon-Gray Lumber Co. v.
Gibraltar Life Ins. Co., 269 S.W. 80, 81 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgmt adopted).
13. 269 S.W. 80 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgmt adopted).
14. Id. at 82.
15. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.12 (Vernon 1980).Article 7.12 provides:
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Courts which have directly considered the question of whether extension statutes based on the Model Act operate to the exclusion of the trust
fund theory have held that the theory does not exist outside these statutes.16 These courts have also held that extension statutes, such as article
7.12 of the Texas Business Corporation Act, do not allow for the recovery
of claims arising after dissolution of the offending corporation.1 ' There
are jurisdictions, however, including some with statutes similar to article
7.12, which have recognized the viability of the trust fund theory outside
its statutory embodiment. 18 Nevertheless, no court has ever recognized
the validity of a claim arising after dissolution of the corporation under

A. The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by the Secretary of State, or (2) by a decree of court when the court has not
liquidated the assets and business of the corporation as provided in this Act, or (3) by
expiration of its period of duration, shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against such corporation, its officers, directors, or shareholders, for any right
or claim existing, or any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other
proceeding thereon is commenced within three years after the date of such dissolution. Any such action or proceeding by or against the corporation may be prosecuted
or defended by the corporation in its corporate name. The shareholders, directors,
and officers shall have power to take such corporate or other action as shall be appropriate to protect such remedy, right, or claim. If such corporation was dissolved by
the expiration of its period of duration, such corporation may amend its articles of
incorporation at any time during such period of three years so as to extend its period
of duration.
Id.; see MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 105 (1971) The only difference between article 7.12
and the Model Act is that article 7.12 extends the two year limitation on claims in the
Model Business Corporation Act to three years. Compare TEx. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art.
7.12 (Vernon 1980) with MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 105 (1971). The annotations to
section 105 classify the state statutes based on the section according to their degree of similarity to the text of the Model Act. Those classified as having identical provisions are:
Alaska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. See MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT
ANN. § 105, 3.01 (1971). Those classified as having provisions "identical in substance" are:
Tennessee, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. Id. 1 3.01. Those classified
as having comparable provisions are: Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. Id. 1
3.02.
16. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Teter, 117 F.2d 716, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1941)
(suit brought on guarantee of dissolved debtor corporation on trust fund theory dismissed
because brought after two years); Gary Furniture & Appliance Co. v. Skinner, 264 So.2d 174,
179-80 (Ala. 1972) (suit brought during extension period but still pending at end of period
abated); Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 411 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (strict
liability action based on trust fund theory not brought within statutory extension period).
17. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Teter, 117 F.2d 716, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1941);
Gary Furniture & Appliance Co. v. Skinner, 264 So.2d 174, 179-80 (Ala. 1972); Blankenship
v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 411 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
18. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 327 F.2d 201, 203-04 (10th Cir. 1964); Snyder v.
State-Wide Properties, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 733, 742 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Drew v. United States,
367 F.2d 828, 830-31 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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either the trust fund theory or relevant statutory extensions. "
20
In Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corporation,
the Supreme Court of
Texas held that article 7.12 operates to the exclusion of the trust fund
theory."1 The court recognized that article 7.12 is analogous to a survival
statute in its operation,22 and thus provides relief for only those claims
arising prior to dissolution.2 A survey of Texas cases construing the predecessor statutes to article 7.12 revealed that the trust fund theory had
never been extended beyond its many previous statutory embodiments.2 4
The court reasoned that because article 7.12 incorporates the trust fund
theory, recognition of this doctrine outside the statute would infer that
the legislature had enacted a meaningless and repetitious law.2 The court
refused to allow the post-dissolution claim,26 since to do so would require
judicial amendment of article 7.12.1
Justice Spears, joined by Justice Ray, vigorously dissented.2 8 The dissenting justices accused the majority of judicially amending article 7.12
by extending its three year limitation to post-dissolution claims, instead
of limiting it to pre-dissolution claims.2 ' The dissent argued that early
Texas cases recognized the trust fund theory independent of statutory

19. See generally Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors Upon
Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets,
30 Bus. LAW. 1061, 1074-77 (1975); Schoone, ShareholderLiability Upon Voluntary Dissolution of Corporation,44 MARQ. L. REV. 415, 425-27 (1961); Wallach, Products Liability: A
Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a Sale of Assets Subsequent Dissolution
on Product Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV. 321, 331-35, (1976).
20. 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981).
21. Id. at 551.
22. Id. at 549. By using the term "survival statute" the court seems to be perpetuating
the common law analogy of a dissolved corporation to a dead person. See generally Chicago
Title and Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 125 (1937);
Life Ass'n of America v. Goode, 71 Tex. 90, 95-6, 8 S.W. 639, 640 (1888); 15A W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, §§ 8127, 8142 (rev. perm. ed. 1979);
Schoone, Shareholder Liability Upon Voluntary Dissolution of Corporation,44 MARQ. L.
REv. 415, 416 (1961); 48 IOWA L. REV. 1006, 1006-09 (1963).

23. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex. 1981).
24. Id. at 550.
25. Id. at 551.
26. Id. at 552. The term "post-dissolution claim" means those claims which can find no
basis in the corporation's existence before dissolution, and arise solely out of circumstances
occurring after the dissolution of the corporation. Compare Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co.,
293 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. Iowa 1968) (tort claim arising eighteen months after dissolution of
corporation and filed three and one-half years after dissolution, dismissed) with Snyder v.
State-Wide Properties, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 733, 742 (N.D. III. 1964) (pre-dissolution creditor
allowed to recover from stockholders holding distributed assets of corporation).
27. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981).
28. Id. at 553-56 (Spears, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 553 (Spears, J., dissenting).
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law, and that article 7.12 has not affected this rule. 0 Justice Spears predicted that persons wishing to assert a claim arising after dissolution will
be left without a remedy, and that "innocent parties" will be left with the
loss.31

The court in Hunter had a choice of basing its ruling either on the
inapplicability of the trust fund theory, 2 since this was the basis of plaintiffs recovery, or on article 7.12. Since Theodore Moeller's claim arose after the dissolution of the Hunter-Hayes Corp., 8 a traditional application
of the trust fund theory would have barred the claim," as this doctrine
has been uniformly limited to claims that can be traced to the pre-dissolution existence of the named corporation."5 Instead, the court in Hunter
went further by basing its decision on the three year limitation period of
article 7.12.86 The legislative intent underlying the extension of the life of

30. Id. at 554 (Spears, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 555 (Spears, J., dissenting). "Innocent parties" refers to the other defendants
in a suit, such as the building owner in this suit. Id. at 555 (Spears, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 550-51; cf. Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 383-84 (1893)
(applicability of trust fund theory); Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. 304, 307-08 (1853) (trust
fund theory created for assertion of pre-dissolution claims); Gaskins v. Bonfils, 79 F.2d 352,
355 (10th Cir. 1935) (applicability of trust fund theory).
33. Fort Worth Capital Corp. v. Hunter, 608 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1980), rev'd, 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981). Moeller's claim was based on the alleged
faulty installation of an oil line shut-off valve installed in the elevator pit in June of 1961
when Hunter-Hayes was still servicing the elevator. Id. at 354. Since Moeller sued on the
basis of strict liability and negligence, his claim had no basis in the pre-dissolution existence
of the corporation. See Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 152 Tex. 534, 537-38,
260 S.W.2d 884, 886 (1953) ("before the act becomes wrongful there must be an invasion of
the rights of the plaintiff"); Adler v. City of Farmer's Branch, 526 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (limitation runs on tort claim when an injury gives
rise to a cause of action, i.e., an invasion of plaintiff's rights); Sims v. Southland Corp., 503
S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (cause of action does not
accrue until actual injury sustained).
34. See Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. Iowa 1968); cf. Stewart v. United States, 327 F.2d 201, 202 (10th Cir. 1964) (creditor recovers for pre-dissolution
claim on basis of trust fund theory); Snyder v. State-Wide Properties Inc., 235 F. Supp. 733,
742 (N.D. II. 1964) (creditor uses trust fund theory to recover pre-dissolution claim from
stockholders holding distributed assets of corporation).
35. See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 327 F.2d 201, 203-04 (10th Cir. 1964); Snyder v.
State-Wide Properties, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 733, 742 (N.D. Il1. 1964); Drew v. United States,
367 F.2d 838, 830 (Ct. Cl. 1966). See generally, 15A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7369-71, 7376-77, 7380-86 (rev. 1979); Norton, Relationship of
Shareholder to Corporate Creditors upon Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the
"Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 Bus. LAW. 1061, 1061-64 (1975); Wallach,
Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a Sale of Assets
and Subsequent Dissolutionon Product DissatisfactionClaims, 41 Mo. L. Rav. 321, 327-29
(1976).
36. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552-53 (Tex. 1981). The origi-
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corporations under article 7,12 is found in its predecessor statutes.3 7 One
such statute 8s recites that the three year extension is for the "purpose of
enabling those charged with the duty, to settle up its [the corporation's]
affairs," 3' referring to the existing affairs of the corporation upon dissolution. By basing its ruling on article 7.12, and construing the legislative
intent of this article as excluding post-dissolution claims, the court
cleared up the confusion surrounding the proper application of this
statute.'
While Hunter appears to foreclose all avenues of recovery for claims
arising after dissolution, ' i the vast majority of claims can be found to
have originated in the pre-dissolution era of the named corporation. For
nal application of the trust fund theory placed no limitation on the time within which a predissolution claim could be brought, other than laches. Compare Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S.
304, 307-08 (1853) (claim allowed under trust fund theory without time limitation) with
Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Teter, 117 F.2d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 1941) (suit dismissed when
brought after two year limitation imposed by statutory embodiment of trust fund theory).
37. See 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 166, § 4(7), at 312 (corporate life extended to settle
business of corporation); 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 80, §§ 39-43, at 73-74, 7 H. GAMMEL,
LAWS OF TEXAS 75-76 (1898) (corporate life extended for maintenance and defense of predissolution creditor suits).
38. 1919 Tex. Gen. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 56, § 31, at 140-41.
39. Id. at 140-41; see Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 147 Tex. 608, 611, 218 S.W.2d
451, 455 (Tex. 1949) (ruling based on article 1389); McBride v. Clayton, 140 Tex. 71, 75-76,
166 S.W.2d 125, 127 (1942) (ruling based on article 1389).
40. Hunter v. Forth Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981) Several
cases upheld recovery under the trust fund theory without ruling on whether the statute
excluded its use. Cf. Stewart v. United States, 327 F.2d 201, 203-04 (10th Cir. 1964) (creditor recovers for pre-dissolution claims on basis of trust fund theory); Snyder v. State-Wide
Properties, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 733, 742 (N.D. I1. 1964) (recovery of distributed assets of
dissolved corporation allowed under trust fund theory); Drew v. United States, 367 F.2d
828, 830 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (stockholders of dissolved corporation liable for income taxes of corporation under trust fund theory).
41. Hunter v. Forth Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 556 (Tex. 1981) (Spears, J.,
dissenting). The majority states, "a provision was included to provide creditors with a statutory remedy for pre-dissolution claims. A similar provision could have been included to encompass post-dissolution claims as well." Id. at 552. There are several alternative theories of
recovery to the trust fund theory. One alternative is the "continuation or successor theory"
used in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974), where the successor
corporation was held liable in tort for an oven sold by a dissolved corporation. Another
alternative is the "de facto merger" theory under which the court held a successor corporation liable in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974). The
most unique theory is the "subsequent duty to warn" theory which creates a duty to warn
where a danger from a product is discovered after it is placed on the market. Shane v.
Hobsam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 528-30 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Contra Chadwick v. Air Reduction
Co., 239 F. Supp. 247, 250 (N.D. Ohio 1965). For a general discussion of these and other
claims against a dissolved corporation, see Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy In
Search of a Defendant-The Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on
Product Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. Rav. 321, 335-44 (1976).
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example, in a breach of warranty claim, the plaintiff brings suit when
there has been some breach of an express or implied warranty. 2 If the
corporation which produced or marketed the product has been dissolved
since the sale of the product, the plaintiff appears to be bringing a post-

dissolution claim. Such a suit is, however, a pre-dissolution claim, since
the warranty attached at the time of sale.'" The plaintiff can, therefore,

find a basis for his suit in the pre-dissolution era of the defendant corporation. Article 7.12 would allow such a claim, if brought within the three
year time limitation, because it operates only to exclude those claims with
no basis in the pre-dissolution era of the named corporation."
The dissenting justices in Hunter based much of their argument on
what appears to be a misuse of the term "post-dissolution" and its application in Texas cases.' 5 The many early Texas cases which discuss the
trust fund theory and its applicability were decided squarely within the
statutory embodiment of this doctrine.4 While the suits in these cases
were not commenced until after the dissolution of the named corporation,
they are distinguishable from the claim in Hunter in that they were all
derived from a right arising prior to the corporation's dissolution.' 7 These

42. See Tax. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 2-313 to 2-316 (Tex. U.C.C.) (Vernon Supp.
1982).
43. Id. §§2-313 to 2-316; accord Darr Equip. Co. V'.Owens, 408 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, no writ) (implied warranty contractual in nature and collateral
to purpose of sales contract); Western Tank & Steel Corp. v. Gandy, 385 S.W.2d 406, 409
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, no writ) (implied warranty arises on part of seller in
connection with contract of sale); Gates Rubber Co., v. Wood, 374 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1964, no writ) (implied warranty is an inherent term of contract.
44. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tex. 1981).
45. See id. at 553-55 (Spears, J., dissenting); see also Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons,
147 Tex. 608, 218 S.W.2d 451 (1949) (trustees of dissolved corporation allowed to exercise
lease option right acquired before dissolution); McBride v. Clayton, 140 Tex. 71, 166 S.W.2d
125 (1942) (action by stockholders of dissolved corporation to acquire proceeds of life insurance policy of corporate officer where premiums had been paid by corporation); Burkburnett
Ref. Co. v. Ilseng, 292 S.W. 179 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted) (directors of
dissolved corporation suing to collect debt acquired before dissolution).
46. See Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 147 Tex. 608, 616, 218 S.W.2d 451, 455 (1949)
(claim to option right acquired before dissolution "to be disposed of in accordance with
articles 1388 and 1389"); McBride v. Clayton, 140 Tex. 71, 75-76, 166 S.W.2d 125, 128 (1942)
(case decided on basis of wording in predecessor statute to article 7.12); Burkburnett Ref.
Co. v. Ilseng, 292 S.W. 179, 182 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted) (case decided on
basis of wording in statute preceding article 7.12)).
47. Compare Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 147 Tex. 608, 611, 218 S.W.2d 451, 455
(1949) (basis of action was lease option right acquired before dissolution) and McBride v.
Clayton, 140 Tex. 71, 75-76, 166 S.W.2d 125, 128 (1942) (action for proceeds of life insurance
policy of corporate officer paid by-corporation before dissolution) and Burkburnett Ref. Co.
v. Ilseng, 292 S.W. 179, 181 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgmt adopted) (basis of action debt
acquired before disolution) and Lyon-Gray Lumber Co. v. Gibraltar Life Ins. Co., 269 S.W.
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cases, therefore, involved pre-dissolution rather than post-dissolution
claims and were decided within the statutes upon which the majority position, limiting the applicability of the trust fund theory to pre-dissolution claims, is founded.'.

The trust fund doctrine was originally created for, and limited to, the
assertion of claims arising before dissolution of a corporation, but which
are brought after the corporation's subsequent demise. As the supreme
court in Hunter observed, the legislature enacted article 7.12 as an embodiment of the trust fund theory and provided a logical limitation of
three years for this remedy. Ruling that article 7.12 operates to the exclusion of the trust fund theory, the Hunter court has now provided guidance to the courts and to the directors of corporations as to the extent of
shareholder liability after corporate dissolution.
Drew R. Fuller,Jr.

80, 81-82 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgmt adopted) (mechanic's lien acquired before dissolution) with Litts v. Refrigerated Transport Co., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 675, 676-77, (M.D. Pa.
1973) (defendant corporation in tort suit not allowed to implead dissolved corporation for
contribution and indemnity) and Bishop v. Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. Iowa
1968) (tort claim arising eighteen months after dissolution of corporation and filed three and
one-half years after dissolution dismissed) and Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 411
N.E.2d 1153, 1155-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (strict liability action accruing after dissolution
dismissed) and Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 548 (Tex. 1981) (tort
claim arising eleven years after dissolution dismissed).
48. See Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 550-51 (Tex. 1981). The
court stated, "Therefore, Article 7.12 expresses a legislative policy to restrict the use of the
trust fund theory to pre-dissolution claims, and to protect shareholders, officers and directors of a dissolved corporation from prolonged and uncertain liability." Id. at 550-51; see
also Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Teter, 117 F.2d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 1941) (trust fund theory
cannot be used to assert claim after expiration of statutory period); Bishop v. Shield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. Iowa 1968) (tort claim arising after dissolution of named
corporation and asserted after statutory period dismissed); Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg.
Co., 411 N.E.2d 1153, 1155-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (strict liability action accruing after dissolution dismissed).
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